A client asks for help with something next to your usual work. You could do it well, and the fee is fair. If you hold a P1 licence, none of that settles it. What can a paralegal do in Ontario? The answer sits in s. 6(2) of By-Law 4. In Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONCA 677, the Court of Appeal read that section as a closed list.
Lawyers should read it too. It is a clean worked example of the method every advocate argues with: ordinary meaning, context, purpose, and the point where an absurdity argument runs out. We walk through the method, then say plainly what it means for a P1 licence. This is a reading of the reasons, not advice on any file.
Why A Scope Case Is An Argument Lesson
The appellant, Mr. Caruso, is a paralegal licensed by the Law Society of Ontario. He challenged the Law Society's reading of By-Law 4: that paralegals may represent applicants before the Immigration and Refugee Board and prepare documents for its hearings, but may not draft documents or provide other immigration and refugee services not related to an IRB hearing (para. 2). The Court of Appeal, in reasons by Justice Paciocco for a unanimous panel, dismissed the appeal (paras. 5 and 98).
Each argument was answered at a different stage of one method. Our piece on what makes a legal argument persuasive says to build backward from the finding you need. Caruso shows the other half: when the finding depends on reading words, the method decides which readings are available to you.
It starts with the standard of review. The appellant argued for correctness, the Law Society for reasonableness. The court declined to decide, because "the LSO’s interpretation of By-Law 4 meets either standard", and assumed the stricter one for the sake of argument (paras. 16 to 18). That move is worth borrowing: if your reading survives the test your opponent prefers, concede the test and argue the reading.
Start With The Words: A Closed List
Meaning comes from text, context and purpose, and the text "remains the anchor of the interpretive exercise" (paras. 19 and 20). So the court began with the words.
Section 6(2) of By-Law 4, which the court sets out in full at para. 9, says a Class P1 licensee "is authorized to do any of the following" and lists six activities. Those words "identify a closed list of legal services" (para. 25), and every item is tied to a proceeding. Advice is authorized only "with respect to a proceeding or the subject matter of a proceeding". Drafting is authorized only for "a document for use in a proceeding" or a document affecting a party's rights with respect to one. In the court's words: "No authority is conferred on paralegals to provide advice in any other context."
The appellant argued for a wider meaning of "proceeding" (para. 26). The court read it in its ordinary sense: a matter before an adjudicative body, not an administrative decision-maker. At para. 28: "The submission and processing of documents is not a ‘proceeding’."
Then the phrase the argument leaned on hardest: "intended proceeding". The by-law says intended, not possible, and "There is a world of difference between the two" (para. 30). An intended proceeding is one being prepared but not yet launched, or planned and then abandoned. A step that could one day end in litigation is not. On the words alone, the Divisional Court's reading stood (para. 33).
Context And Purpose: What The By-Law Was Built To Do
The appellant argued that the Law Society Act widened the words, since it defines "legal services" broadly. The court explained that the broad definition marks out what unlicensed people may not do, and s. 26.1(3) allows a licensee to provide legal services only "to the extent permitted by the licensee’s licence" (paras. 8 and 38). That sends you straight back to By-Law 4.
Access to justice got a short answer too. The appellant said the narrow reading impeded it. The court called that "an argument of policy about the choices the LSO made, not an argument of statutory interpretation about what the by-law the LSO enacted means" (para. 39). A policy argument dressed as an interpretive one rarely gets past a careful bench.
On purpose, the court went to the text first. The by-law was built to let paralegals do advocacy work in lower courts and tribunals while continuing to bar what has customarily been called solicitors' work (para. 44). The history confirmed it: "The LSO intended By-Law 4 to permit regulated paralegals to do advocacy work, such as appearing before the IRB, but not solicitors’ work before the IRCC and the CBSA" (para. 46). The later statements the appellant relied on came after the by-law was passed, so they could not show what its makers intended (para. 62).
When An Absurdity Argument Fails
The last argument was that the line is arbitrary: paralegals handle Small Claims Court, Landlord and Tenant Board and IRB matters, so barring them from immigration applications makes no sense (para. 67). The court treated this as an absurdity argument and rejected it twice.
First, the presumption against absurdity is a secondary rule. It applies only to genuine ambiguity, meaning "two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute" (para. 70, citing Bell ExpressVu). Without ambiguity, the legislature's intention "must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be" (citing McIntosh). Text, context and purpose had already produced one answer. In the court's own reasons (para. 70):
There is no reasonable interpretation of By-Law 4 that would support paralegal authority to engage in non-adjudicative legal work. The only reasonable interpretation it bears is the one that the Divisional Court arrived at, leaving no room to consider the presumption against arbitrariness.
Second, even if the presumption applied, the line was not arbitrary. Confining paralegals to advocacy has a long history and rests on access to justice, the oversight a tribunal gives over work done before it, and pragmatism (paras. 57 and 71).
An absurdity point is a tiebreaker. It cannot create the tie. This is the step order we would use to test a statutory reading before it goes into a factum:
- Read the words in their ordinary sense and mark every limiting phrase, such as "with respect to a proceeding".
- Go to the definitions before the dictionary.
- Read the provision with its enabling statute, and ask what each broad definition is there to do.
- Find purpose in the text first, then in history that predates the enactment.
- Ask honestly whether you have two plausible readings. If not, absurdity arguments never get started.
- Separate interpretation from policy. If your best point is that the rule is unwise, it belongs to the rule-maker.
- Test your reading against the standard of review your opponent prefers.
What A P1 Licence Covers After Caruso
So, what can a paralegal do in Ontario? Under s. 6(2) of By-Law 4, a P1 licensee may give advice, represent a party, do anything mentioned in s. 1(7) of the Law Society Act that the rules of procedure governing a proceeding require, negotiate, and select, draft, complete or revise documents, each only in connection with a proceeding or intended proceeding as s. 6(1) defines it: in the Small Claims Court, in the Ontario Court of Justice under the Provincial Offences Act, in a summary conviction court in the cases the by-law lists, before a tribunal established under an Ontario or federal Act, and before a person dealing with a claim, such as a mediator or an arbitrator.
Caruso adds three practical points:
- A proceeding means a hearing before an adjudicative body. Filing with an administrative decision-maker is not one (para. 28).
- An intended proceeding is one being prepared, not any step that might possibly lead to a hearing (para. 30).
- In immigration and refugee matters, IRB representation and documents for its hearings are inside the licence; other services, including IRCC and CBSA matters, are outside it (paras. 11, 22 and 46). A paralegal working outside the licence is not "in good standing" under the federal Act (para. 94), which "effectively incorporates the limits imposed in By-Law 4" (para. 96).
One limit on this summary: if a retainer sits near the line, read the by-law against the specific service before you accept it.
Reading a provision this closely is the same skill you use the moment you stand to make submissions. Our list of programs includes one built for that moment: the 2026 Legal Argument Bootcamp. It is coach-driven: you deliver your argument on camera and get feedback. It costs $250 + HST and is eligible for up to 3 Substantive Hours.
Every class is recorded, so you can join now and catch up on the recordings. To ask about the next date, contact us.